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ARGUMENT
This case concerns an unconsummated sale of real property with water rights, and the
recording of a wrongful lien. In August of 2007, BBRD, Inc. and/or Richard Davis
(collectively "Davis") made an offer to buy property from Plaintiff, LD III, LLC ("LD111").
The offer was set out in a standard form Real Estate Purchase Contract for Land ("REPC").
Plaintiff accepted that offer. However, before closing, BBRD failed to meet the deadlines
of the REPC and it terminated according to its terms. BBRD then filed a lien against the real
property. LD III sued to remove the lien, seeking relief under the Utah wrongful lien statute.
The parties discussed the concept of settlement. The parties agreed to the price and
parties set in the REPC, but all remaining terms were left open. Davis agreed to prepare
settlement documents containing the specific terms of Davis1 settlement offer
("Counteroffer"). However, the documents Davis prepared contained significantly different
settlement terms than had been discussed by the parties and imposed new risks, burdens and
obligations upon LD III which were unacceptable.

Therefore, LD III rejected the

Counteroffer, leaving the parties without any settlement agreement.
Davis moved to specifically enforce the Counteroffer as a settlement agreement.
Fourth District Court Judge Howard granted Davis' Motion to Enforce Settlement
Agreement. LD III appealed the decision. The appeal raises the question of whether there
was a meeting of the minds and whether material terms missing from the Counteroffer
constitute a settlement agreement. Both a meeting of the minds and a complete agreement
are necessary for the enforcement of a settlement agreement and neither exist.
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Davis claims he and LD III reached an enforceable settlement agreement based on
email exchanges between counsel, when read together with the terms of the REPC. Davis
further argues he has since resolved his issues relating to the transfer of property (which gave
rise to the original dispute) and, therefore, LD III breached the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing by not closing on the transaction.1 Davis further claims he should receive
attorneys1 fees for defending this appeal.
Davis1 claims are without merit. There was no final agreement showing a meeting of
the minds on the terms of settlement and, further, the Counteroffer Davis drafted was not
consistent with the terms ofthe REPC, the document upon which the parties based settlement
discussions. Davis' Counteroffer was nothing more than a counteroffer, which LD III
rejected. Therefore, LD III did not breach any covenant or agreement. Further, LD Ill's
appeal has merit, is made in good faith and Davis' request for attorneys' fees should be
denied.
This Court should grant LD Ill's appeal, reverse the District Court's decision, and
relieve LD III from enforcement of the unlawful settlement agreement.
I.

There was No Meeting of the Minds to Form a Settlement Agreement
Because Davis Included Additional Parties in the Sale Without LD Ill's
Approval.

Davis argues LD III failed to marshal the evidence to contradict the District Court's
findings and to present any evidence that the parties agreed to transfer the property to Davis
alone. (See Appellee's Brief, pp. 17-19.) Davis relies solely upon self-serving affidavits of
1

Davis failed to file a cross-appeal. Therefore, this issue is not properly before the
Court of Appeals and should not be considered.
2

his counsel, Zundel and Boevers. Davis fails to mention the email exchanges between the
parties' counsel during settlement discussions, and fails to account for the proffered
testimony and arguments presented in open court, which are directly to the contrary. The
email exchanges clearly show there was no meeting of the minds on terms of the settlement,
and are the best and least-biased evidence showing the parties had two materially different
ideas about settlement; namely, who were the buyers in the transaction. See Crismon v.
Western Co. of North America, 742 P.2d 1219,1221 (Utah App. 1987) ("contractual mutual
assent requires assent by all parties to the same thing in the same sense so that their minds
meet as to all the terms.") Thus, there was no meeting of the minds and no settlement. (See
also Oberhansleyv. Earle, 572P.2d 1384,1386 (Utah 1977) stating "[i]t is a basic principle
of contract law there can be no contract without a meeting of the minds of the parties.")
On July 9, 2008, there was a telephone conference between both parties1 counsel
where they discussed a proposed settlement. (Affidavit of Michael N. Zundel ("Zundel
Aff."), H 6 (R. 287); Affidavit of James A. Boevers ("Boevers Aff."), ] 3 (R. 305).) The
outline for settlement anticipated a written agreement would follow up the oral discussions,
and the writing would mirror the original terms of the REPC (with such modifications as
would be necessary because of the passage of time). (Zundel Aff., fl 7-8 (R. 286); Boevers
Aff., Tffl 4-5 (R. 305.) The understanding of both parties was that a writing reflecting all the
terms would be prepared allowing "defendant Davis [to] complete his purchase from
plaintiff of real property and water rights pursuant to a Real Estate Purchase Contract
signed by the parties on August 29, 2007." (Affidavit of Richard H. Thornton ("Thorton
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Aff"), <[ 3 (emphasis added) (R. 341).) Davis? counsel was to prepare the settlement
documents "necessary to close the real estate transaction pursuant to the August 29, 2007
contract." (Id.)
On July 18.2008, Davis1 counsel, Mr. Thornton, sent an email to Mr. Snuffer, counsel
for LD III, stating "I am waiting for some final legal descriptions, at which time I will be able
to finalize (and then send to you) proposed closing documents." (Id., Exhibit A thereto (R.
336-338).) On July 28,2008, Mr. Thornton sent an email to Mr. Snuffer stating f,[a]ttached
for your review are drafts of the following closing documents for the sale of LD III property
to Richard Davis. Mr. Davis desires to have the different parcels conveyed to affiliated
companies and designees as shown in the deeds ... Please review these documents and
matters and get back to me as soon as possible with your comments." (Id., Exhibit B
thereto (emphasis added) (R. 329-331).)
Two days later on July 30, 2008, Mr. Snuffer sent an email to Mr. Zundel, Davis1
counsel, stating "I received the documents and have forwarded them for review and
comment from the client. Unfortunately, [Ms. Mower] fell down at her home and was
injured... which has rendered her less able to function in all respects." (Zundel Aff., Exhibit
B thereto (emphasis added) (R. 278-279).) The next day, on July 31,2008, Mr. Snuffer sent
a second email to Mr. Zundel, stating "I just got an email informing me that Bart Bailey's
father passed away yesterday. [Ms. Mower] wants Bart to look over the documents before
she gives me final word." (Id., Exhibit C thereto (emphasis added) R. 276-277).) Mr.
Zundel responded "[t]he schedule you suggest is workable." (Id.) After delays due to family
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and personal emergencies, the seller and her counsel, Mr. Bailey, reviewed the draft
documents and saw they deviated substantially from what was discussed. The draft
documents contained terms which would j eopardize terms ofMs. Mower's Federal probation.
On August 20, 2008, Mr. Garriott, LD Ill's counsel, sent an email to Zundel stating, "the
terms of the proposed settlement of this matter are not acceptable to our client." (Id., Exhibit
F thereto (R. 270-271).)
The email exchanges between the parties' counsel confirm there was never a meeting
of the minds to form a settlement agreement. The parties discussed a proposed settlement
on the terms contained in the original REPC. However, when the settlement documents were
prepared, Mr. Thornton informed Mr. Snuffer that Davis desired to convey parcels to
different entities or parties - which was not covered by the REPC or discussed. This
Counteroffer was never approved by LD III and, in the initial response, Mr. Snuffer stated
his client will need to review and comment on the variations from the prior agreement. Mr.
Zundel agreed to the schedule. Mr. Garriott then informed Davis' counsel the Counteroffer
was not accepted. The terms of the REPC did not allow for "designees," as Davis now
argues. In fact, designees were never discussed, nor made an issue in this case, until Davis
presented the Counteroffer containing that additional term.
Davis' counsel confirmed this position during argument before Judge Howard on
Davis' Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement. Mr. Zundel specifically stated to the Fourth
District Court:
The opposition simply takes the position that because in the a, closing
documents that we submitted we did not list Mr. Davis and BBRD as the
5

grantees but a, for [sic] additional companies that Mr. Davis controls as
grantees, that we made some sort of counterproposal. That is not true. I mean
we're, we have made clear to Mr. Snuffer and his clients that we're happy with
the language of the original contract and the settlement.
(See R. 693, Hearing transcript from September 17,2008, pp. 4:19-25, 5:1-2.)
Judge Howard questioned Mr. Zundel about the terms ofthe agreement and, referring
specifically to new transfer documents provided to LD III that day, asked:
THE JUDGE:
I guess the question I have is if you concede or
agree that you had a settlement but the documents don't conform to your
settlement, do you intend to have the document, the closing document conform
to your settlement?
MR. ZUNDEL:

They do now.

(Id. at p. 5:16-21.)
Davis never told the District Court, "Davis or his designee" could be substituted as
the purchasers of the property. Rather, Davis argued that although he desired to convey the
properties to other persons and entities, and although he had attempted to make that change
in the agreement, he would concede he was required instead to follow the terms of the
original REPC. (Id., see also pp. 14:9-17; 15:8-12; 18:17-22; 21:18-22.)
Davis wants to convey the parcels to different entities, not to Davis. But this was
never within the terms of the REPC. Nor was this discussed or agreed to as one of the terms
of settlement. The emails from Thornton (the attorney drafting the documents) state the
transaction requires LD III to sell the property to Davis; however, the Counteroffer submitted
to LD III requires LD III to convey the property to five different entities, none of which were
Davis. Therefore, the parties did not agree on one of the essential contract terms: the identity
of the buyer(s). There was no meeting of the minds. Therefore, there was no settlement.
6

II.

Because Davis Included Additional Parties to the Sale in the Proposed
Settlement Offer, It Constituted a Counteroffer, Which LD m Rejected.

The Counteroffer was a rejection of the last offer of settlement and a new counteroffer of settlement. The Counteroffer contained materially different terms from the REPC,
including a tax-evasion scheme, which LD III necessarily could not accept. Davis fails to
address this argument anywhere in his response brief. Because of its importance we are
compelled to address it again here.
"To create a binding contract the acceptance must unconditionally agree to all the
material provisions of the offer, and must not add any new material conditions." RJ. Dawn
Const Co, v. Child, etal, 122 Utah 194,202 (1952) (citations omitted). "A reply to an offer,
though purporting to accept it, which adds qualifications or requires performance of
conditions, is not an acceptance but is a counter-offer." Wadsworth Const v. City of St
George, 865 P.2d 1373,1376 (Utah App. 1993) (emphasis added) (citingi?.J. Daum Constr.
Co., 247 P.2d at 821). "An acceptance which is equivocal or upon condition or with a
limitation is a counteroffer and requires acceptance by the original offeror before a
contractual relationship can exist." John Hancock Mut Life Ins. Co. v. Dietlin, 199 A.2d
311, 313 (R.I. 1964) (emphasis added).
Also, "[a]n offeree's proposal of different terms from those of the offer constitutes
a counteroffer, and no contract arises unless the original offeror accepts it
unconditionally." Cal Wadsworth Constr., 898 P.2d at 1378 (emphasis added). If material
terms are altered, the altered form becomes a counteroffer and therefore a rejection of the
original offer. SeeNunleyv. Westates CasingServs., Inc., 1999UT 100,^27,989P.2d 1077
7

(mAn acceptance must unconditionally assent to all material terms presented in the offer,
including price and method of performance, or it is a rejection of the offer.'") (quoting Cal
Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St. George, supra, at p. 1376.)
Here, the Counteroffer was materially different from any prior communication
between the parties. The email exchanges show the proposed settlement was to enforce the
terms of the original REPC, with the property conveyed from LD III to Davis. (Thornton
Aff., f 3 (R. 341).) However, the Counteroffer required LD III to convey the property and
water rights to five totally different buyers, none of whom are parties to the REPC. {Id.,
Exhibit B thereto (R. 309-331).) This variation on the terms of settlement created a much
different transaction than contemplated by the terms of the REPC.
Further, Mr. Thornton's email confirms the change in settlement terms. {Id. (R. 329330).) ("Mr. Davis desires to have the different parcels conveyed to affiliated companies and
designees as shown in the deeds.") This variation in terms constitutes a rejection of the
earlier proposal and a new counteroffer by Davis.
III.

The Counteroffer Materially Increased LD Ill's Risk as Seller Because It
Involved Her in a Tax-Evasion Scheme by Requiring Her to Sell the
Property to Five Buyers Without Disclosing Income Tax to Davis.

Davis argues there is no anti-assignment clause in the REPC and, therefore, Davisf
rights are assignable. Davis further argues he previously transferred his rights to purchase
a portion of the property to a separate party. (See Appellee's Brief, pp. 19-20.) However,
the law is clear that an assignment is invalid if it materially changes the duty of the obligor
or materially increases the obligor's risk or burden in the transaction:
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A party can assign its contractual rights to a third party unless: (a) the
substitution of a right of the assignor would materially change the duty of the
obligor, or materially increase the burden or risk imposed on him by his
contract, or materially impair his chance of obtaining return performance, or
materially reduce its value to him.
{Restatement 2nd of Contracts, §317(2) (1981).)
Here, Davis1 Counteroffer materially increased the burden and risk to LD III by
implicating LD III and Ms. Mower in Davis1 scheme to evade income taxes. Davis argues
there is no evidence in the record to support this claim; however, the alteration of the
transaction changes the tax implications (by concealing a re-sale and profits derivedfromthat
re-sale) and is clearly a tax-evasion scheme. Under the REPC, LD III was required to convey
the real property with water rights to Davis. The closing would be a reported tax event.
After receiving title, if Davis wanted to re-sell the real property and water rights for a taxable
gain, he could sell to whomever he wanted, but that re-sale would also be a reported tax
event. The transfer and closing for all of these transactions would be reported to the IRS, and
the taxes owing on any gain to Davis from re-selling the real property and water rights would
be due and owing by Davis as ordinary income.
Under the Counteroffer, Davis' taxable gain is concealed in the direct sale (which
conceals a re-sale2), because the buyers from Davis receive title directly from LD III and
2

In tax parlance this is called a "step-transaction" - the IRS will not allow form to rule
over substance. "The incident of taxation depends upon the substance of the
transaction...[T]he transaction must be viewed as a whole, and each step, from the
commencement of negotiations to the consummation of the sale, is relevant...To permit the
true nature of a transaction to be disguised by mere formalisms, which exist solely to alter
tax liability, would seriously impair the effective administration oftax policies of Congress."
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.,324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945). Further, the government is
"not bound to recognize as the substance or character of a transaction a technically elegant
9

there would be no reporting of the intermediate sale (and gain) by Davis. The Counteroffer
transfers the property from LD III to five separate purchasers, none of which are Davis,
thereby involving Ms. Mower in a conspiracy to evade payment of income taxes. See
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.} 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945) (The incident of taxation
depends on the substance of the transaction, not the form); Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308
U.S. 355,357-58 (1939); Lucas v. Earl 281 U.S. I l l , 115 (1930). The Counteroffer hid the
re-sale and the taxable gain, and created a criminal scheme whereby Davis would be able to
evade payment of taxes.
Davis' scheme unreasonably implicates LD III and Ms. Mower in this conspiracy. For
Ms. Mower, the sole member of LD III, to participate in Davis' scheme puts her in peril of
violating the terms of her parole, and being prosecuted as part of Davis' tax-evasion scheme.
LD III could not accept the Counteroffer. It never would have considered the Counter Offer
had its terms been disclosed before it was prepared. LD III could not allow itself to be
implicated in any way with this illegal scheme. Therefore, LD III rejected the Counteroffer
and there was no settlement. The District Court erred in finding an enforceable settlement
agreement, and the Court of Appeals should reverse and relieve LD III from any obligation
to go forward with this unlawful new transaction.

arrangement which a lawyer's ingenuity has devised." Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S.
355, 357-58 (1939). As such, taxes cannot be escaped "by anticipatory arrangements and
contracts however skilfully [sic] devised ... by which the fruits are attributed to a different
tree from that on which they grew." Lucas v. Earl 281 U.S. 111,115 (1930).
10

IV.

Davis Raises New Arguments on Appeal that Should Not be Addressed By
the Court of Appeals.
A.

Davis1 New Argument that He Never Insisted the Transfer Be to
His Designees is a Misrepresentation to the Court of Appeals and
Should Not Be Addressed By the Court of Appeals.

On appeal, Davis raises a new argument: "he never insisted that the transfers be to
his designees." (See Appellee's Brief, p. 21 (emphasis added).) Specifically, Davis argues
he never required the property to be conveyed from LD III to Davis and his designees and,
further, he claims to have agreed to take title to the property in his name alone and close the
transaction. Davis never raised this argument in the District Court. This new argument
should not be considered by this Court. It was never raised in the District Court. This is
improper.
The Court of Appeals will "not address any new arguments raised for the first time
on appeal." Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Center, 70 P.3d 904,911 (Utah 2003); see
also Coombs v. Juice Works Dev., Inc., 91 P.3d 769,772, fh. 3 (Utah App. 2003). From the
outset of this litigation, Davis argued the REPC allowed LD III to transfer the property to
Davis or his designees. In Davis' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to
Enforce Settlement Agreement, Davis states "plaintiff and defendants,... agreed to settle this
action by completing the sale of the real property and water rights at issue, from plaintiff to
defendant Richard W. Davis, or his designee." (Memo. Enforce Settlement, p. 2 (emphasis
added) (R. 268).) The affidavits of both Davis' counsel, Mr. Zundel and Mr. Boevers,
additionally state the transfer of property was to be from LD III to Davis or his designee.
(Zundel Aff., 1} 7 (emphasis added) (R. 286).) Davis' Reply Memorandum in Support of
11

Defendants1 Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement also states "the parties agreed to settle
this action by completing the sale of the real property and water rights at issue, from plaintiff
to defendant Richard Davis, or his designees." (Reply. Enforce Settlement, p. 2 (emphasis
added) (R. 422).) Davis further argued his counsel confirmed the transfer of property to
Davis or his designee, and LD III did sell a portion of the property to one of Davis1
designees. (Id., p. 3 (R. 421).) Davis argued the settlement required LD III to sell the
property to Davis or his designee.
On appeal, Davis now argues he "never insisted the transfers be to his designees."
(Appellee's Brief, p. 21.) However, Davis contradicts himself by stating "The agreement is,
and always has been, that the transfers could be made to Davis* designees ...." (Appellee's
Brief, p. 23.) This inconsistency demonstrates there could not have been a meeting of the
minds. There was no settlement and Davis1 new argument on appeal should not be addressed
by the Court of Appeals.
Moreover, Davis argues LD III previously interpreted the REPC as permitting
transfers from it to Davis' designees. (See Appellee's Brief, p. 19.) Davis bases this
argument upon a transfer of one portion of the property to an unrelated party named Charles
Wamer. However, just as Davis mentions, that transfer occurred "[pjrior to filing this
action." (Id.) It had nothing to do with either the lawsuit or the proposed settlement, and has
no bearing on either. This is a wholly severed transaction involving the parties agreement
to allow that single sale to go forward. It was done to avoid the complication of involving
another party in this dispute.
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B.

Davis1 New Argument that LD JR Breached the Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing is a New Argument that Should Not be
Addressed By the Court of Appeals.

Davis also argues for the first time on appeal LD III breached the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing by not closing on the settlement agreement. (Appellees Brief, p. 23.)
Davis continues n[t]he fact that LDIII [sic] refused to accept resolution of its only concern
about the form of the closing documents, simply illustrates the absence of good faith and fair
dealing on its part." (Id.) This argument is unfounded and improper. It was not discussed
at the District Court level or considered by Judge Howard in issuing his ruling. The Court
of Appeals should not address this new argument. Smith, 70 P.3d at 911.
Even if the Court of Appeals addresses Davis' new argument, there is still no
settlement agreement and LD III did not breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The Counteroffer had materially different terms, and materially increased the risks and
burdens upon LD III. LD III was required to accept all material terms, "including price and
method of performance, or it [was] a rejection of the offer." Nunley v. Westates Casing
Servs., Inc., 989 P.2d 1077, 1086 (Utah 1999). It does not matter that Davis discarded his
Counteroffer and prepared new documents that transfer title to him alone. His Counteroffer
was still a counter offer. LD III could not and did not accept the method of performance of
the Counteroffer. Doing so would place LD III (and therefore Ms. Mower) as a willing party
in a tax-evasion scheme. Under Utah law, LD III rejected Davis' Counteroffer and there is
no settlement. Id LD III did not breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
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V.

Davis is Not Entitled to Attorneys' Fees Because LD Ill's Appeal is Based
Upon Fact and Law and is Not Frivolous.

Davis lastly makes a claim for an award of attorneys' fees. (See Appellee's Brief, pp.
24-25.) Davis' claim is without basis and should be denied. LD Ill's appeal is neither
frivolous, nor without factual basis. The Utah Court of Appeals has stated, "We recognize
that sanctions for frivolous appeals should only be applied in egregious cases, lest there be
an improper chilling of the right to appeal erroneous lower court decisions." Porco v. Porco,
752 P.2d 365,369 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). An appeal isfrivolousif it "is not grounded in fact,
not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law." Utah R. App. P. 33(b)(2008 Supp.); see also O'Brien v. Rush, 744
P.2d 306, 310 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("A frivolous appeal is one without merit.")
Davis attempts to diminish the factual bases of LD Ill's appeal through its own
interpretation of the facts, particularly by disregarding the email communications between
the parties1 counsel. Davis argues the only evidence pertaining to the settlement is confined
to the Affidavits of Mr. Zundel, Mr. Thornton, and Mr. Boevers. (See Appellee's Brief, p.
24.) However, the email communications between the parties are much more relevant than
an advocates' affidavit. By email, Mr. Thornton admits the transfer of property isfromLD
III to Davis alone then adds, "Mr. Davis desires to have the different parcels conveyed to
affiliated companies and designees as shown in the deeds." (Thornton Aff, Exhibit B thereto
(R. 330).) It is clear, that if there was to be a settlement agreement, Davis was to receive the
property transfer in his name, in conformity with the REPC, but that Davis' closing
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documents did not conform and further added qualifications to the sale. This is a counter
offer demonstrating LD IITs appeal is based in fact and law.
Davis also contends LD III misrepresents the record concerning settlement
negotiations and the form of the settlement documents, and by claiming Davis was
attempting to commit tax evasion. (See Appellee's Brief, p. 24.) LD III does not
misrepresent the record. LD IITs arguments emphasize the least-biased evidence, namely
the email communications between the parties1 counsel and the substance of the transaction.
Just as the IRS looks to the substance of the transaction over the form, LD III highlights the
tax implications of Davis1 Counteroffer as a tax-evasion scheme, which is exactly what was
discovered by LD Ill's counsel upon receipt of the Proposed Closing Documents. There is
no misrepresentation. The appeal is based in fact and law.
Lastly, Davis contends LD III misrepresents the record in its comparison of the REPC
with the closing documents prepared by Mr. Thornton. (See Appellee's Brief, pp. 24-25.)
Again, LD III does not misrepresent the record. Comparing the REPC to the closing
documents (Counteroffer), it is clear the two do not align. The REPC requires the property
be sold from LD III to BBRD, Inc., and/or Richard Davis. (Boevers Aff., Exhibit A thereto
(R. 297-302).) The Counteroffer deeds the property from LD III to Stephen Sandstrom and
Jennifer Sandstrom; SWLRD, LLC; PBRD, LLC; Richard W. Davis and Beverly B. Davis,
as trustees of The R.W. Davis Family Protection Trust; and BBRD L.C. (Thorton Aff.,
Exhibit B thereto (R. 321-327).) None of the buyers in the Counteroffer are buyers in the
REPC. Further, Mr. Thornton's email confirms Davis desired to have different parcels
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conveyed to different parties. (Id. (R. 330).) This is an additional, material requirement
apart from the terms listed in the REPC. Therefore, LD III does not misrepresent the record.
Davis should not receive his attorneys' fees. LD Ill's appeal is not frivolous or
baseless, and LD III does not misrepresent the record. LD Ill's arguments are based in fact
and law. There was no settlement agreement because there was never a meeting of the
minds. Therefore, LD Ill's appeal is sound. The District Court erred in finding an
enforceable settlement agreement. LD Ill's appeal is warranted and there is no basis for an
award of attorneys' fees to Davis.
CONCLUSION
Pursuant to the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this Court to reverse the
decision of the Fourth District Court and to find there is no enforceable settlement agreement
here.
DATED this

5

day of June, 2009.
& POULSEN

Jehver C. Snuffer, Jr.
Steven R. Paul
Daniel B. Garriott
Attorneys for Appellant
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